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Abstract. Representation and reasoning over legal rules is an important application
domain and a number of related approaches have been developed. In this work, we
investigate legal reasoning in practice based on three use cases of increasing com-
plexity. We consider three representation and reasoning approaches: (a) Answer
Set Programming, (b) Argumentation and (c) Defeasible Logic. Representation and
reasoning approaches are evaluated with respect to semantics, expressiveness, effi-
ciency, complexity and support.
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1. Introduction
Representation of legal rules and reasoning over them is a critical application area since
laws and regulations are used in almost all human activities. Furthermore, corpora per-
taining to laws and regulations are typically complex and enormous in size, thus experts
are usually needed in order to apply legal reasoning in everyday life. Even for experts,
this is a laborious, time-consuming, error-prone and costly process, which is why le-
gal reasoning was one of the first application domains of artificial intelligence since its
emergence, and more so after the proliferation of expert systems during the 1980s.
The logic-based structure of laws and regulations and the considerable benefits of
of automating the representation and reasoning processes has led to extensive research
towards this direction. The importance and visibility of such research in recent years can
be exemplified with the emergence of the field of Regulatory Technology (RegTech [1]).
However, the complexity of the legal domain has made progress difficult, with several
issues being raised, such as: (a) the ambiguity of natural language used to express the
laws, which leads to different interpretations; (b) the existence of different conflicting
rules that are applicable on the same case; and (c) the need to do reasoning in light of
new information.
In this work, we identify and compare three distinct approaches that are capable of
addressing some of these issues through features such as non-monotonic reasoning and
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conflict resolution. These are: Answer Set Programming, Argumentation and Defeasi-
ble Logic. Three use cases of increasing complexity are used for the comparison: a sce-
nario on the presumption of innocence, licensing contractual clauses for the evaluation
of a product and the reporting regulations on new drugs imposed by the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA). The main contributions of this work are the investigation
of practical considerations of legal representation and reasoning through the aforemen-
tioned real-world use cases and a comparative evaluation of existing approaches and re-
lated tools used for these tasks. These, in turn, can assist in identifying strengths and
weaknesses of various approaches, allowing for more informed choices on the appro-
priate solutions to different legal representation and reasoning problems. To the best of
our knowledge this work is the first to present a comparison of the aforementioned ap-
proaches for practical legal reasoning.
This paper is organised as follows. A concise summary of efforts related to legal
representation and reasoning is presented in Section 2. A description of the three use
cases follows in Section 3. Representation and reasoning results using the three selected
approaches are presented in Section 4 and they are critically evaluated in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
2. Background and Related Work
Early attempts at realising legal reasoning involved representing legislation in the form
of Horn logic programs, such as Sergot et al.’s seminal work on the British National-
ity Act [2]. However, monotonicity and the treatment of negation in pure Prolog proved
problematic. Extensions that support negation as failure and negated conditions solve
some issues but raise others, such as the cases of double negation and counterfactual con-
ditionals (e.g. “if it didn’t rain”). Also, introducing new exceptions to existing legisla-
tion would mean rewriting the whole logic program to take such exceptions into account.
Hence, Prolog and its variants prove useful only in representing self-contained and stable
legislation [3], but even so, they can only model the questions that need to be answered
in a legal debate, not how they are to be answered [4].
Following the advent of the Semantic Web and the introduction of the OWL family
of languages, several research efforts focused on examining whether description logics
are a suitable candidate for representing and reasoning about legislation. A prime exam-
ple is HARNESS [5], which shows that well-established sound and decidable descrip-
tion logic reasoners such as Pellet can be exploited for legal reasoning, if, however, a
significant compromise in terms of expressiveness is made.
A common issue that arises when using classical or description logics in legal repre-
sentation and reasoning is the fact that they are monotonic: logical consequences cannot
be retracted, once entailed. This is in contrast to the nature of law, where legal conse-
quences have to adapt in light of new evidence and conflicts between different regulations
must be accounted for and resolved. Therefore, it is natural to employ non-monotonic
logic for the purposes of legal reasoning. The Defeasible Logic framework [6] has been
applied in a legal reasoning setting due to its simplicity and flexibility and the fact that
several efficient implementations exist. In this framework, rules can either behave in the
classical sense (strict), they can be defeated by contrary evidence (defeasible), or they
can be used only to prevent conclusions (defeaters).
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The notions of permission and obligation are inherent in normative reasoning but
are not explicitly defined in traditional logic systems; deontic logic was introduced to
serve this purpose. Permission and obligation are represented by modal operators and are
connected to each other through axioms and inference rules. While there has been some
philosophical criticism on deontic logic due to its admission of several paradoxes (e.g.
the gentle murderer), deontic modalities have been introduced to various logics to make
them more suitable for normative reasoning. For instance, Governatori et al. [7] show
how the aforementioned Defeasible Logic framework can be extended to model beliefs,
intentions, obligations and permissions.
Legal reasoning, at its core, is a process of argumentation, with opposing sides at-
tempting to justify their own interpretation, with appeals to precedent, principle, policy
and purpose, as well as the construction of and attack on arguments [8]. AI and law re-
search has addressed this with models that are based on Dung’s [9] influential work, such
as ASPIC+ [10], which offers means of producing argumentation frameworks tailored to
different needs in terms of the structure of arguments, the nature of attacks and the use
of preferences.
As argued by Brewka et al. [11], the high complexity of argumentation processes,
including legal reasoning, makes them a prime application target for Answer Set Pro-
gramming, a non-monotonic logic programming formalism, specifically aimed towards
search problems of NP or higher complexity.
3. Use Cases
3.1. Use case 1: Presumption of Innocence
The first use case demonstrates the importance of the semantics of default inference in
legal representation and reasoning. Presumption of innocence is the principle that one is
considered innocent until proven guilty. Consider the following scenario in a legal case:
• Evidence A suggests that the defendant is not responsible.
• Evidence B suggests that the defendant is responsible.
• Sources for evidence A and B are equally reliable.
• According to the underlying legal system a defendant is presumed innocent (i.e.
not guilty) unless responsibility has been proven (without any reasonable doubt).
• If the defendant is found to be innocent, they are entitled to compensation.
Given both evidences A and B, ambiguity exists as it is unclear whether the de-
fendant should hold any responsibility. Thus, under this situation and with the under-
lying legal system, we should conclude that the defendant is not guilty and is entitled
to compensation. However, if we allow the ambiguity with regard to responsibility to
propagate, then the defendant’s guiltiness should also be considered ambiguous; hence
an undisputed conclusion cannot be drawn.
3.2. Use case 2: Smart Contracts in Blockchain Systems
The second use case, extracted from [12], is a typical example of legal reasoning related
to contracts on blockchain systems and illustrates the intricacies inherent in the represen-
tation of the notions of permission and obligation. The following licensing contractual
clauses are assumed for the evaluation of a product:
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• Article 1. The Licensor grants the Licensee a licence to evaluate the Product.
• Article 2. The Licensee must not publish the results of the evaluation of the Prod-
uct without the approval of the Licensor; the approval must be obtained before
the publication. If the Licensee publishes results of the evaluation of the Prod-
uct without approval from the Licensor, the Licensee has 24 hours to remove the
material.
• Article 3. The Licensee must not publish comments on the evaluation of the Prod-
uct, unless the Licensee is permitted to publish the results of the evaluation.
• Article 4. If the Licensee is commissioned to perform an independent evaluation
of the Product, then the Licensee has the obligation to publish the evaluation
results.
• Article 5. This licence will terminate automatically if Licensee breaches this
Agreement.
Article 2 is of particular interest since it contains a reparation clause. Suppose that
the licensee publishes the evaluation results without authorisation, then removes them
within 24 hours. Then, according to Article 2, the licence to use the product still holds.
3.3. Use case 3: US FDA New Drugs Records and Reports Regulations
The third use case is much larger than the previous two; it includes legislation from the
United States Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, specifically Title 21 - Food and
Drugs, Part 310 - New Drugs, Subpart D - Records and Report. Specifically, the reg-
ulations define: (a) the reporting requirements for manufacturers, packers and distribu-
tors and (b) information on various life-threatening, serious or unexpected adverse drug
experiences that have been reported in case safety reports. The legislation contains 8
paragraphs, with some of them containing as many as 12 requirements and can be found
in [13]. For example, paragraph (c)(1) of the legislation requires that manufacturers,
packers or distributors must report to FDA each adverse drug experience no later than
15 calendar days from initial receipt of complaint; however, this requirement is lifted if
there is no reasonable possibility that the drug caused the adverse experience.
4. Representation and Reasoning
In this section, we present rule-based representations for the three use cases in the previ-
ous section, as well as reasoning results using these representations. The decision on can-
didate approaches was based on two fundamental criteria for practical legal reasoning:
support for preferences over rules and availability of reasoning tools. Given these criteria,
we selected the following: (1) Answer Set Programming (ASP), specifically Disjunctive
Logic Programs with Inheritance [14]; (2) Argumentation, specifically structured argu-
mentation within the ASPIC+ framework [10]; and (3) Defeasible Logic, specifically the
extended version that supports deontic modalities [7].
4.1. Representation and Reasoning using ASP
ASP is an expressive form of Logic Programming based on the stable model semantics
and supporting disjunction, among others. An extension introduced in [14] allows the
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expression of rule priorities by organising rules in inheritance networks and is imple-
mented by the DLV system [15]. Given two objects (rules or rule sets) o1 and o2, o2 : o1
denotes that o2 is more specific than o1 and overrides it, in case of conflict. Use case 1 is
encoded as follows:
r1 {responsible:- evidenceA.} r2 {-responsible:- evidenceB.}
r4 {-guilty:- 1=1.} r3:r4 {quilty:-responsible.}
r6 {-compensation :- 1=1.} r5:r6 {compensation:- -guilty.}
evidenceA. evidenceB.
Tautology 1=1 is required because objects in inheritance networks have to comprise
rules and not facts. Running the DLV system using this encoding as an input yields no
results (no stable models) because of the contradiction caused by rules r1 and r2; this is
left unresolved and, as a result, no undisputed conclusions can be derived.
For use case 2, since deontic modalities are not supported natively by any ASP
representation, we can only represent obligation explicitly within predicate names, while
permission on a literal is encoded as a negated obligation on the literal’s negation (Oa≡
¬P¬a). The legislation of use case 2 is encoded as follows:
:- obl_publish, obl_not_publish.
art10 {obl_not_use :- 1=1.}
art11:art10 {-obl_not_use :- hasLicence.}
art21 {obl_not_publish :- 1=1.
obl_remove :- publish, obl_not_publish.}
art22:art21 {-obl_not_publish :- hasLicense, hasApproval.}
art31 {obl_not_comment :- 1=1.}
art32:art31 {-obl_not_comment :- -obl_not_publish.}
art40:art21{obl_publish :- hasLicence,isCommissioned.
-obl_not_publish :- hasLicence,isCommissioned.}
art51:art11 {obl_not_use :- violation.}
art52:art40,art22 {obl_not_publish :- violation.
-obl_publish :- violation.}
hasLicence. publish.
The last two facts represent the case where the licensee has published results without hav-
ing approval or being commissioned. Performing reasoning results in the stable model
{hasLicence, publish, -obl_not_use, obl_not_publish, obl_remove,
obl_not_comment}, which includes the permission to use, the obligations not to pub-
lish or comment and the obligation to remove published results. For use case 3, only the
encoding for paragraph (c)(1) is presented due to space limitations. The full encoding,
along with all other encodings can be found at https://github.com/gmparg/JURIX2018.
r5{obl_MPD_report_electronically_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days
:- MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports.}
r6:r5{-obl_MPD_report_electronically_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days
:-MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports_nocause.}
Note that if we are limited to the standard ASP format (ASP-Core-2), used
by systems such as clingo [16] and DLV2 [17], then to compensate for the lack
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of support for preferences over rules, extra negation-as-failure literals need to be
included in rule bodies; for instance, to express in use case 2 that permission to
use applies to a licensee unless they have violated the agreement, we use the rule
-obl_not_use :- hasLicence, not violation. Reformulated encodings using
negation as failure can also be found at https://github.com/gmparg/JURIX2018.
4.2. Representation and Reasoning using Argumentation
In the case of argumentation, using an abstract framework would offer only a coarse-
grained level of representation which is not enough for fully representing a legal doc-
ument. Structured argumentation, on the other hand, as is the case of argumentation
according to ASPIC+, is capable of representing legislation since it supports encoding
knowledge bases with axioms and premises. We used TOAST [18], an online ASPIC+
implementation. Use case 1 is encoded as follows (presented using TOAST’s argumen-
tation theory structure and syntax):
Premises: evidenceA; evidenceB;
Assumptions: default;
Rules:
[r1] evidenceA => responsible; [r2] evidenceB => ~responsible;
[r3] responsible => guilty; [r4] default=> ~guilty;
[r5] ~guilty => compensation; [r6] default => ~compensation;
Rule Preferences: [r4] < [r3]; [r6] < [r5];
Note that rules in TOAST must have bodies, hence the inclusion of the default predicate.
The computed extension contains only asserted facts evidenceA and evidenceB since
arguments from r1 and r2 defeat each other, which is equivalent to the reasoning outcome
in ASP. For use case 2, deontic modalities again need to be encoded explicitly, since
deontic extensions like the one in [19] have not been implemented yet:
Premises: hasLicence; publish;
Assumptions: default;
Preferences: default < hasLicence; hasLicence < violation;
Rules:
[r1] default => obl_not_use;
[r2] hasLicence => ~obl_not_use;
[r3] default => obl_not_publish;
[r4] publish, obl_not_publish => obl_remove;
[r5] hasLicence, hasApproval => ~obl_not_publish;
[r6] default => obl_not_comment;
[r7] ~obl_not_publish => ~obl_not_comment;
[r8] hasLicence, isCommissioned => obl_publish;
[r9] hasLicence, isCommissioned => ~obl_not_publish;
[r10] violation => obl_not_use;
[r11] violation => obl_not_publish;
Rule Preferences:
[r1] < [r2]; [r3] < [r5]; [r6] < [r7]; [r3] < [r8]; [r3] < [r9];
[r2] < [r10]; [r5] < [r11]; [r8] < [r11]; [r9] < [r11];
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Contrariness:
obl_publish-obl_not_publish;
The added preferences prevent implicit attacks caused by rules with contradictory
heads; also, a contrariness relation is needed for every pair of arguments that are contra-
dictory. Similarly to ASP, the computed extension includes the arguments for permission
to use, obligation not to publish or comment and obligation to remove published results.
For use case 3, we show here only the rules that correspond to paragraph (c)(1):
[r8] MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports=>
obl_MPD_report_electronically_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days;
[r9] MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports_nocause=>
~obl_MPD_report_electronically_to_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days;
4.3. Representation and Reasoning using Defeasible Logic
For Defeasible Logic, we opted to use SPINdle [20], since it is the only reasoner that
natively supports deontic extensions, which are necessary for use case 2. The encoding
for use case 1 is as follows:
r1: evidenceA => responsible r2: evidenceB => -responsible
r3: responsible => guilty r4: => -guilty
r5: -guilty => compensation r6: => -compensation
>> evidenceA >> evidenceB
r3 > r4 r5 > r6
Note that Defeasible Logic allows expressing defeasible rules without bodies (pre-
sumptions). The reasoning output includes the following (with +/-D meaning definitely
provable/not provable and +/-d meaning defeasibly provable/not provable: -D respon-
sible(X), -D -responsible(X), -d responsible(X), -d -responsible(X), -D guilty(X), -D -
guilty(X), +d -guilty(X), -d guilty(X), -D compensation(X), -D -compensation(X), +d
compensation(X), -d -compensation(X). This means that, in contrast to DLV and TOAST,
SPINdle infers the defeasible conclusion that the defendant is not guilty. This is due to
the default ambiguity blocking behaviour in SPINdle; if we switch to ambiguity propa-
gation, then the result will contain no derived conclusions, as in DLV and TOAST.
For use case 2, we use deontic modalities (Permission/Obligation) both on literals
and rules, by adding [P] or [O] before the literal or at the end of a rule label. Syntax
label[O]: A=>B is equivalent to label: A=>[O]B. The encoding is as follows:
Art10[O]: => -use(X)
Art11[P]: hasLicence(X) => use(X)
Art21[O]: => -publish(X)
Art21rep[O]: [O]-publish(X), publish(X) => remove(X)
Art22[P]: hasLicence(X), hasApproval(X) => publish(X)
Art31[O]: => -comment(X)
Art32[P]: [P]publish(X) => comment(X)
Art40[O]: hasLicence(X), isCommissioned(X) => publish(X)
Art40p[P]: hasLicence(X), isCommissioned(X) => publish(X)
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Table 1. Comparison of the presented approaches
ASP Argumentation Defeasible Logic
Expressiveness
Negation As Failure, Negation As Failure Presumptions,
Disjunction Deontic Modalities
Inconsistency Handling Propositional Direct/Indirect [10] Paraconsistent [21]
Support (Reasoning) DLV TOAST SPINdle
Complexity ΣP2 , Π
P
2 [14] P [22] Linear [7]
Art51[O]: violation(X) => -use(X)
Art52[O]: violation(X) => -publish(X)
Art11 > Art10 Art22 > Art21 Art32 > Art31
Art40 > Art21 Art51 > Art11
Art52 > Art40 Art52 > Art40p Art52 > Art22
>> hasLicence(X) >> publish(X)
Rule Art21rep implements the reparation clause of Article 2, while Art40p explicitly de-
rives permission from obligation. The output includes the following defeasible deriva-
tions: +d [O]-comment(X), -d [P]comment(X), +d [O]-publish(X), -d [O]publish(X), -d
[P]publish(X), +d [P]use(X), -d [O]-use(X), +d [O]remove(X). These correspond to the
same obligations and permissions that are derived from the DLV and TOAST encodings.
For use case 3, the following rules correspond to paragraph (c)(1):
FAERSr8: MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports(X)=>
[O]MPD_report_electronically_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days(X)
FAERSr9: MPD_report_15_day_Postmarketing_Alert_reports_nocause(X)=>
[P]-MPD_report_electronically_adverse_drug_exper_in_15_days(X)
5. Critical Evaluation
In this section, we present a comparative evaluation of the three approaches based on the
experience gained by representing the three use cases and reasoning with the represented
knowledge. We begin with a summary of common characteristics. All three approaches
operate under the semantics of closed-world assumption. In terms of expressiveness, they
all support non-monotonic reasoning, classical negation and preferences between rules.
All approaches are efficient is terms of reasoning time. Even in use case 3 all reasoners
return results within two or three tenths of a second. Finally, in all three approaches,
while a number of reasoning tools have been developed, there is currently no tooling
support for representation, to the best of our knowledge. This means that any legislation
has to be manually encoded in the respective languages supported by the reasoners.
Table 1 summarises the differences among ASP, argumentation and Defeasible
Logic, in what concerns legal knowledge representation and reasoning. In terms of ex-
pressiveness, Defeasible Deontic Logic is clearly the most efficient approach, supporting
presumptions, permissions and obligations, which make representation an easier, faster
and less error-prone process. In contrast, the other approaches have to compensate by ex-
pressing modalities explicitly within predicate names and by using default predicates or
tautological rule bodies to model presumptions. In cases where legislation changes rel-
atively often, adapting ASP and argumentation encodings would require comparatively
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more time and effort. It should be noted that while disjunction (supported by ASP) and
negation as failure (supported by ASP and TOAST), do not feature in any of the use
cases we examined, they may still be useful in encoding different types of legislation.
An important difference that manifests in use case 1 is the way the three approaches
handle inconsistency. The pair of conflicting rules on responsibility lead to unsatisfiabil-
ity in ASP, because DLV (and other reasoners) assume the standard propositional def-
inition of consistency. TOAST behaves in the same way, with the computed grounded
extension containing only the asserted facts, due to ASPIC+’s definition of direct consis-
tency. SPINdle, on the other hand, due to the paraconsistent nature of Defeasible Logic,
infers the defeasible conclusion of not guilty, which can be argued to be closer to com-
mon sense reasoning. Note that Defeasible Logic offers the flexibility to support both
cases: the aforementioned derivation is for the default ambiguity blocking semantics,
while the alternative ambiguity propagation would not derive any undisputed conclusion.
Differences in inconsistency handling appear also in the case of contradicting facts
in the knowledge base. ASP reasoners conclude that there is no stable model, while both
argumentation and Defeasible Logic approaches allow the contradicting facts to be used
in further inferences, ensuring however that no form of the principle of explosion is
possible. Both of these ways to address inconsistent input can be useful, depending on
whether the point is to detect inconsistencies or to derive results despite them. However,
it should be noted that both TOAST and SPINdle lack some form of acknowledgment of
the existence of inconsistency (e.g. a warning message), which would be fundamental in
addressing cases where inconsistency is not desired, but is the result of mistaken input.
In terms of reasoning support, there is at least one stable reasoner available for each
approach. SPINdle is the most recent, released in 2014, while TOAST and DLV were
released in 2012. Though there are more recent ASP reasoners (e.g. clingo and DLV2),
they do not support preferences over rules. There are also several other alternatives for
argumentation (e.g. the Tweety libraries at http://tweetyproject.org/). In what concerns
complexity, all algorithms implemented by the aforementioned reasoners are of polyno-
mial time complexity, albeit at different points in the polynomial hierarchy: Defeasible
Logic is at the lowest level (linear), followed by argumentation (P) and then ASP (NP).
A more detailed comparison of ASPIC+ and Defeasible Logic can be found in [23].
6. Conclusions and Future Research Directions
We have presented a practical demonstration of how existing approaches and tools can
be used for legal representation and reasoning. In terms of representation, all approaches
are capable of encoding standard elements of legislation, though with different levels of
efficiency depending on their expressive power. Reasoning results can vary, especially
when conflicting rules without preferences or conflicting facts are included; in such cases
particular attention is needed in order to employ the most appropriate approach (and
provide the proper encoding) that corresponds to the intended behaviour.
Interesting research directions that can be derived from the presented critical com-
parison include: (a) improving existing reasoners in terms of reporting inconsistencies
and support for deontic modalities; (b) exploring much larger use cases that may require
some form of large-scale reasoning, as discussed in [24]; and (c) providing tool support
for representation on top of the existing reasoners by exploiting research in legal natural
language processing.
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